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PARK'N FLY, INC. v. DOLLAR PARK AND FLY, INC.:
A WELCOME REVIEW BY THE SUPREME COURT OF
TRADEMARK INCONTESTABILITY
The Lanham Act (the Act),' passed in 1946, was the first national legis-
lation designed to protect the exclusive use of trademarks.2 One of the
benefits of the Act is that registrants' use of a trademark can become
"incontestable." ' The status of incontestability precludes significant chal-
lenges to an owner's right to use the trademark.4 In the past, some courts
distinguished between the offensive and defensive assertions of incontestable
trademark rights.5 These courts held that while the incontestability of a
plaintiff's trademark could protect the mark from cancellation, it could not
serve as the basis for an "offensive" injunction against a defendant who
1. Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act), Pub. L. No. 79-489, 60 Stat. 427 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1982)).
2. Congress's authority to protect trademarks in the Lanham Act is based on the Commerce
Clause, U.S. CoNsT. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3. Federal protection is provided for trademark owners
who register their marks according to the requirements of the Lanham Act. These requirements
include the filing of a written application and a drawing of the mark. 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a)(i),
(a)(2) (1982). The United States Patent and Trademark Office reviews the application to insure
that it complies with statutory guidelines. These guidelines command that the trademark shall
not be refused registration unless it: "[c]onsists of or comprises immoral, deceptive, or scan-
dalous matter," "resembles a mark registered in the Patent and Trademark Office . . . [so] as
to be likely . . . to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive," or "when applied to
the goods of the applicant is primarily geographically descriptive or deceptively misdescriptive
of them." Id. § 1052(a), (d), (e). Once the Patent and Trademark Office determines that the
trademark is qualified for registration, it is published in the Official Gazette. Id. § 1062(a).
Within thirty days of publication, an opposition proceeding to prevent registration may be
brought by persons who claim that they would be injured by the registration of the mark. Id.
§ 1063. A certificate of registration is issued when the trademark is not challenged. Id.
§ 1057(a). This certificate of registration "shall be prima facie evidence of the validity of the
registration, registrant's ownership of the mark, and of registrant's exclusive right to use the
mark in commerce in connection with the goods or services specified in the certificate." Id.
§ 1057(b). Trademark owners who use their mark in commerce are protected in their use by
federal law. Id. § 1051.
3. Incontestability is a substantive right provided by three sections of the Lanham Act. 15
U.S.C. § 1064, 1065, 1115(b) (1982). After a mark is registered and in continuous use for five
years, the mark becomes incontestable and the owner is guaranteed exclusive use of the mark,
subject to certain exceptions. See infra note 30. Sections 15 and 16 provide for the cancellation
and application for incontestable status respectfully. Id. §§ 1064, 1065.
4. Challenges foreclosed by the Act include allegations that the mark is inferior in priority
to the defendant's mark, and that the mark is descriptive without having a secondary meaning.
See Ooms and Frost, Incontestability, 14 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 220 (1949).
5. See generally Union Carbide Corp. v. Ever-Ready Inc., 531 F.2d 366, 373-77 (7th Cir.)
(discussion of offensive/defensive distinction), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 830 (1976).
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seeks to use a mark similar to the registrant's mark. 6 While the Seventh
Circuit and other courts denounced this distinction,7 the Ninth Circuit only
permitted the defensive assertion of incontestability under the Lanham Act.'
Because of the judicial split of opinion over the Lanham Act, the incon-
testability of trademarks has not been uniformly protected.9
To ensure consistency in the federal circuits, the United States Supreme
Court reviewed the incontestability provisions of the Lanham Act in Park'N
Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc. In Park'N Fly, the Court determined
that a trademark owner can rely on the incontestable status of a mark to
enjoin an infringement." The Court also held that an infringing party cannot
defend its use of a mark by proving that the registrant's mark is merely
descriptive and therefore improperly registered.' 2 The Court did not follow
6. See, e.g., Schwinn Bicycle Co. v. Murray Ohio Mfg. Co., 339 F. Supp. 973, 982 (M.D.
Tenn. 1971) (incontestability provision, intended to protect a registration from cancellation by
a prior user, cannot be relied upon as an "offensive weapon" in infringement action).
7. Union Carbide Corp. v. Ever-Ready, Inc., 531 F.2d 366 (7th Cir.) (Congress had not
intended to limit incontestable rights to their defensive use), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 830 (1976).
Following the Seventh Circuit's holding, the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth
Circuits all allowed trademark owners to rely on the incontestable status of their mark in an
infringement action. See United States Jaycees v. Philadelphia Jaycees, 639 F.2d 134 (3d Cir.
1981) (adopting Seventh Circuit reasoning); Wrist-Rocket Mfg. Co. v. Saunders Archery Co.,
578 F.2d 727 (8th Cir. 1978) (Seventh Circuit analysis supercedes Eighth Circuit precedent on
incontestability); Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1976)
(invalidating the offensive/defensive distinction); Skippy, Inc. v. CPC Int'l, Inc., 210 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 589 (E.D. Va. 1980) (incontestable provisions do not embody offensive/defensive
distinction), modified, 674 F.2d 209 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 969 (1982); Park'N Fly,
Inc. v. Park & Fly, Inc., 489 F. Supp. 422 (D. Mass. 1979) (reasoning in Union Carbide more
persuasive than reasoning behind offensive/defensive distinction).
8. See infra notes 49-55 and accompanying text; see also Lindy Pen Co., Inc. v. Bic Pen
Corp., 725 F.2d 1240 (9th Cir. 1984) (court applies offensive/defensive distinction to limit
plaintiff's incontestable trademark rights).
9. For an analysis of the opposing judicial interpretations of the incontestability provisions,
see McKnight, Section 33(b) of the Lanham Act: What Effect in Trademark Infringement
Litigation? 72 TRADE-MARK REP. 329 (1982).
10. 105 S. Ct. 658 (1985).
11. Id. at 667.
12. Id. A "merely descriptive mark" describes the product to which it is attached; it does
not identify the origin of the product. These marks have a primary meaning that "describes a
characteristic or ingredient of an article." Miller Brewing Co. v. G. Heilemann Brewing Co.,
561 F.2d 75, 79 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978); Application of Keebler Co.
479 F.2d 1405 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (language that describes a quality of the product is "primarily
descriptive"; "RICH'N CHIPS" for chocolate chip cookies held descriptive).
A merely descriptive term may be registered when it "has become distinctive of the applicant's
goods in commerce." 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f) (1982). Thus, a merely descriptive mark is registrable
once it has acquired the secondary meaning of indicating the source of origin of the product.
Union Carbide Corp. v. Ever-Ready, Inc., 531 F.2d 366 (7th Cir.) (holding that the descriptive
EVEREADY mark was valid based on the proof of secondary meaning), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
830 (1976). The court in Union Carbide stated, "[wlhile perhaps not many know that Carbide
is the manufacturer of EVEREADY products, few would have any doubt that the term was
being utilized other than to indicate the single, though anonymous, source. A court should not
play the ostrich with regard to such general public knowledge." 531 F.2d at 381.
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the conventional trademark analysis, which focused on the strength 3 of a
plaintiff's incontestable mark, to determine whether an infringing mark
actually hurt the registrant. 4 Instead, the Court examined the incontestability
provisions and legislative history of the Lanham Act, and concluded that
the Act did not support the offensive/defensive distinction drawn by the
Ninth Circuit. 5 The Court's determination settles definitively that trademark
owners hold incontestable trademark rights that can be enforced against
infringing parties. '
6
THE PARK'N FLY DECISION
In 1967, the plaintiff corporation, Park'N Fly, Inc., established an airport
parking facility business in St. Louis, Missouri. 7 The plaintiff registered the
name "Park'N Fly" in Missouri after a search for other users of the name.'
On August 13, 1969, the plaintiff filed for federal trademark registration of
13. The strength of a trademark is determined by its ability to distinguish the trademarked
good from similar goods. A trademark is considered weak when it does not distinguish the
source of the good. Such marks are deemed to be "generic" or "common descriptive." Section
14(c) of the Lanham Act provides for the cancellation of registered common descriptive marks
at any time. 15 U.S.C. § 1064(c) (1982). The rationale for the difference in the statutory
treatment of "common descriptive" marks and "merely descriptive" marks was set forth by
the court in Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1976):
In the former case [generic terms] any claims to an exclusive right must be denied
since this in effect would confer a monopoly not only of the mark but of the
product by rendering a competitor unable effectively to name what it was endeav-
oring to sell. In the latter case [merely descriptive terms] the law strikes the balance,
with respect to registration, between the hardships to a competitor in hampering
the use of an appropriate word and those to the owner who, having invested money
and energy to endow a word with the good will adhering to his enterprise, would
be deprived of the fruits of his efforts.
537 F.2d at 10. A generic term is subject to cancellation because it fails to comply with the
trademark requirement of distinguishing the source of goods. See, e.g., King-Seeley Thermos
Co. v. Aladdin Indus., 321 F.2d 577 (2d Cir. 1963) ("thermos" held to be the common
descriptive name for vacuum bottle); Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., 272 F. 505 (S.D.N.Y.
1921) ("aspirin" held to be the common descriptive name of acetyl salicylic acid, as understood
by the general public); Folsom and Telply, Trademarked Generic Words, 70 TRADE-MARK REP.
206 (1980) (discussion of cases that define the term "generic"); Treece and Stephenson, Another
Look at Descriptive and Generic Terms in American Trademark Law, 66 TRADE-MARK REP. 452
(1976) (discussing doctrine of secondary meaning in trademark law).
14. Even courts that give a broad construction to the incontestability provisions have
reviewed whether incontestable marks can be registered. See Union Carbide Corp. v. Ever-
Ready, Inc., 531 F.2d 366 (7th Cir.) (because of overwhelming evidence of incontestable mark's
secondary meaning, court need not determine whether the mark was registrable as descriptive),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 830 (1976).
15. See infra notes 61-73 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 53-64 and accompanying text.
17. Park'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc., 217 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 968, 969 (D. Or.
1982).
18. Id.
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the words "Park'N Fly," along with an airplane logo;' 9 the registration was
approved on August 31, 1971.20 Between 1969 and 1971, the plaintiff opened
four other facilities in Cleveland, New Orleans, Houston, and San Fran-
cisco.2" Under section 15 of the Lanham Act, the plaintiff filed an affidavit
to establish the incontestable status of its trademark.2 2 The plaintiff then
affirmatively enforced its trademark right by sending cease and desist letters
to, and bringing actions against, companies that infringed the mark. 3
In 1977, the plaintiff discovered that the defendant, Dollar Park and Fly,
Inc., had been using the name "Dollar Park and Fly" to identify its services
since 1973; the defendant ran an airport parking lot business in Portland,
Oregon. 24 Following the defendant's refusal to drop the company name, the
plaintiff filed a trademark infringement action in the District Court of
Oregon. 25 The plaintiff alleged that the defendant infringed its incontestable
mark by using the same terms, "park and fly," for the same kind of
business. 26 The plaintiff invoked section 32(l)(a) of the Lanham Act to
permanently enjoin the defendant's use of the words "Park and Fly." 27
The defendant argued that the plaintiff's "Park'N Fly" mark should be
deemed invalid because it was a common description of the plaintiff's
services.2 8 The defendant also argued that the expression "Park'N Fly" was
19. Id. Federal registration of trademarks protects the owner's exclusive use of the mark.
The federal registration procedures enhance the security of trademark use by: (I) publishing
marks that have become registrable in the Official Gazette, which serves as constructive notice
to other potential users, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1062, 1072 (1982); (2) providing for opposition proceedings
to be initiated within 30 days by any persons who believe they would be damaged by the
registration, id. § 1063; (3) allowing cancellation proceedings, id. § 1064; and (4) allowing
concurrent use and interference proceedings, id. §§ 1052, 1066, 1067. See generally In re Beatrice
Foods Co., 429 F.2d 466 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (prior user of a trademark in current use is prima
facie entitled to national registration).
20. 217 U.S.P.Q. at 969. The district court stated that, "the use of the words 'Park'N
Fly' alone creates the same, continuing, commercial expression as the words 'Park'N Fly' and the
logo of the airplane." Id. at 970. The plaintiff did not lose its right to the words "Park'N
Fly" when it registered them together with the logo.
21. Id. at 969.
22. Id. Section 15 of the Act provides that if a mark has been registered and continuously
and exclusivly used for five years with no pending action, then the right of the registrant to
use the mark becomes incontestable upon the filing of a proper affidavit. 15 U.S.C. § 1065
(1982).
23. 217 U.S.P.Q. at 969. See Park'N Fly, Inc. v. Park & Fly, Inc., 489 F. Supp. 422 (D.
Mass. 1979) (Park'N Fly's incontestable mark infringed by the defendant's Park & Fly mark).
24. 217 U.S.P.Q. at 969.
25. Id. at 970.
26. Id.
27. Id. Section 1114(l)(a) of the Lanham Act provides that a trademark registrant may
bring an action for infringement against a party who seeks use of the same or a similar term
in a manner "likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive." 15 U.S.C.
§ I4(l)(a) (1982).
28. 217 U.S.P.Q. at 970; see, e.g., Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. General Mills Fun Group, Inc.,
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"merely descriptive" of the plaintiff's services, and therefore could not be
enforced.29 The plaintiff responded that, because the mark was incontestable,
a "merely descriptive" defense could not be maintained. The defense was
not among those listed in section 33(b) of Lanham Act, which limits those
defenses that can be raised against a registered incontestable mark."
The district court dismissed the defendant's claim that the plaintiff's
"Park'N Fly" mark was invalidly registered.3 The court observed that to
611 F.2d 296, 301 (9th Cir. 1979) (common descriptive marks could not become trademarks
because public did not perceive them as primarily associated with particular source), on remand,
515 F. Supp. 448 (N.D. Cal. 1981), rev'd, 684 F.2d 1316 (9th Cir. 1982), cerl. denied, 459
U.S. 1227 (1983).
29. 217 U.S.P.Q. at 970. Merely descriptive marks are designations that require proof of
secondary meaning to achieve trademark status because they have a primary meaning that
describes information about the qualities and characteristics of the product for which they were
registered. See, e.g., Miller Brewing Co. v. G. Heileman Brewing Co., 561 F.2d 75, 79 (7th
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978).
30. Section 33(b) of the Lanham Act, as amended, states:
If the right to use the registered mark has become incontestable under section 1065
of this title, the registration shall be conclusive evidence of the registrant's exclusive
right to use the registered mark in commerce or in connection with the goods or
services specified in the affidavit filed under the provisions of said section 1065
subject to any conditions or limitations stated therein except when one of the
following defenses or defects is established:
(1) That the registration of the incontestable right to use the mark was obtained fraudulently;
or
(2) That the mark has been abandoned by the registrant; or
(3) That the registered mark is being used, by or with the permission of the registrant or a
person in privity with the registrant, so as to misrepresent the source of the goods or
services in connection with which the mark is used; or
(4) That the use of the name, term, or device charged to be an infringement is a use,
otherwise than as a trade or service mark, of the party's individual name in his own
business, or of the individual name of anyone in privity with such party, or of a term
or device which is descriptive of and used fairly and in good faith only to describe to
users the goods or services of such party, or their geographic origin; or
(5) That the mark whose use by a party is charged as an infringement was adopted without
knowledge of the registrant's prior use and has been continuously used by such party
or those in privity with him from a date prior to registration of the mark under this
chapter or publication of the registered mark under subsection (c)'of section 1062 of
this title: Provided, however, that this defense or defect shall apply only for the area in
which such continuous prior use is proved; or
(6) That the mark whose use is charged as an infringement was registered and used prior
to the registration under this chapter or publication under subsection (c) of section 1062
of this title of the registered mark of the registrant, and not abandoned: Provided,
however, That this defense or defect shall apply only for the area in which the mark
was used prior to such registration or such publication of the registrant's mark; or
(7) That the mark has been or is being used to violate the antitrust laws of the United
States.
15 U.S.C. § 1115(b) (1982).
31. 217 U.S.P.Q. at 971 (ordering defendant to cease using the words "Park and Fly" and
any other mark confusingly similar to "Park'N Fly").
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overcome the presumption of validity given to registered marks, the defend-
ant had the initial burden of proving that the plaintiff's trademark registra-
tion was defective. 2 The court found that the defendant did not sustain its
burden on this point. The court determined that the term "Park'N Fly"
was not a common descriptive mark, i.e. one that failed to distinguish the
plaintiff's service from other airport parking lots." The court also rejected
the defendant's contention that "Park'N Fly" was a merely descriptive
mark.14 The court followed a Seventh Circuit decision, Union Carbide Corp.
v. Ever-Ready, Inc.," and ruled that the defendant could not challenge the
validity of an incontestable mark on the ground that it was merely de-
scriptive.16 The court stated that an incontestable mark could only be chal-
lenged on the limited grounds listed in section 33(b) of the Lanham Act. 7
Accordingly, the district court upheld the validity of plaintiff's "Park'N
Fly" trademark.
The district court also enjoined the defendant from using the name "Park'N
Fly" to identify its services. The court found that the defendant's "Park
and Fly" designation was indistinguishable from the plaintiff's "Park'N
Fly" mark. 8 The court rejected the defendant's argument that, because the
companies were located in different geographical areas, there was no likeli-
hood of confusion between the two parking lot services. 9 Because the
defendant and the plaintiff were in the same business, the court concluded
that the plaintiff had proven a likelihood of confusion in the marketplace
between the two companies.' The court concluded that the plaintiff was
entitled to injunctive relief to protect its use of the trademark.',
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit substantially
reversed the district court and overturned the injunction against the defend-
ant. 42 The appellate court began its analysis by affirming the validity of the
plaintiff's mark, despite the defendant's claim that the plaintiff's mark was
32. Id. at 970; see, e.g., Hindu Incense v. Meadows, 692 F.2d 1048 (6th Cir. 1982) (burden
to disprove incontestability not carried by allegation that the mark is descriptive);'Coit Drapery
Cleaners, Inc. v. Coit Drapery Cleaners of New York, Inc., 423 F. Supp. 975 (E.D.N.Y. 1976)
(burden to disprove incontestability rests on the party that asserts right to use mark).
33. 217 U.S.P.Q. at 970; see supra note 13 (definition of common descriptive marks under
Lanham Act).
34. Id.
35. 531 F.2d 366 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 830 (1976).
36. 217 U.S.P.Q. at 970.
37. Id.; see supra note 30 and accompanying text.
38. 217 U.S.P.Q. at 970.
39. Id. The court stated that, "Itlhe owner of a federal registration must have the security
of knowing that no one else may, henceforth, legitimately adopt his trademark and create rights
in another area of the country superior to his own."
40. Id.
41. Id. at 970-71.
42. Park'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc., 718 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1983).
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a common description of the plaintiff's business. 3 For the mark to be
considered a common description, the court decided, the defendant was
required to establish something more than a simple connection between the
words "park and fly" and a description of the airport parking facilities
business." The defendant's evidence that a number of operators had been
using a name similar to "park and fly" placed the validity of the plaintiff's
mark in question.45 The court noted, however, that the defendant failed to
prove that the public related the "Park'N Fly" mark with the service
offered." Because the evidence that supported the defendant's common
description claim was weak, the court of appeals affirmed the district court's
opinion that the mark was valid.
While the court of appeals agreed that the plaintiff had an exclusive right
to use the "Park'N Fly" mark, it concluded that the petitioner was not
entitled to injunctive relief. The court recognized that the Seventh Circuit
had interpreted incontestable trademark rights as conclusively establishing
the registrant's exclusive right to use a mark, 47 yet the court decided to
follow prior Ninth Circuit determinations that conflicted with the Seventh
Circuit approach. 48 The court reaffirmed its 1965 decision in Tillamook
County Creamery Association v. Tillamook Cheese & Dairy Association, 49
in which it held that a trademark holder cannot enjoin a defendant's use of
a mark under the Lanham Act when the plaintiff's similar mark was invalidly
registered."' In this case, the court agreed with the defendant that the
plaintiff's similar mark, although validly registered, was merely descriptive.,,
The Park'N Fly court concluded that because there was no evidence that
the plaintiff's mark had acquired a secondary meaning,5 2 the "Park'N Fly"
mark should never have been registered. Consistent with Tillamook, the
43. Id. at 330. The court reviewed the meaning of the terms "common descriptive" and
"merely descriptive." The court stated that a common descriptive mark "is one that refers, or
has come to be understood as referring, to the genus of which the particular product or service
is a species; a merely descriptive mark specifically describes a characteristic or ingredient of an
article or service." Id. at 329.
44. Id. at 330.
45. Id. The court also discovered that, "the word 'park' followed by a verb suggesting the
activity to follow occurs frequently in commerce."
46. Id.
47. Id. at 331. The court observed that the incontestable right was asserted by the plaintiff
in an infringement action.
48. Id.; see supra note 8 and accompanying text.
49. 345 F.2d 158 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 903 (1965).
50. The court drew the conventional offensive/defensive distiction: "A registrant can use
the incontestable status of its mark defensively, as a shield to protect its mark against cancellation
and to protect its right to continued use of the mark, but not offensively, as a sword to enjoin
another's use." 718 F.2d at 331.
51. 718 F.2d at 331. The expression was said to be a "clear and concise" description of
the service offered, and therefore readily understood by airport patrons.
52. Id. The plaintiff did not claim that its mark had acquired a secondary meaning.
1985]
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court held that the defendant's use of the words "Park and Fly" could not
be enjoined.
The United States Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit53 and held
that a trademark owner can rely on the incontestable status of the mark to
enjoin an infringement . 4 The Court based its decision on the legislative
history of the Lanham Act and the language of the incontestability provi-
sions. The Court observed that Congress enacted the incontestability provi-
sions to protect the owner's exclusive use of federally registered marks.
According to the Court, Congress recognized that labelling the source of the
product for consumer identification helps to maintain product quality and
promotes competition.16 To provide greater protection for trademarks, Con-
gress adopted the incontestability provision to limit the types of challenges
that can be made against a mark's validity.5 '
The Supreme Court reviewed the language of the incontestability provisions
and determined that a mark which is merely descriptive can be registered
and accorded the status of incontestability." The Lanham Act, however,
distinguishes between "common descriptive" marks and "merely descriptive"
marks. The Court observed that common descriptive marks cannot be reg-
istered under the Act because, by definition, they are not distinctive of a
source of goods.5 9 A merely descriptive mark, by contrast, can be registered
if it is proven to be distinctive. 60 The court held that a merely descriptive
mark can qualify for incontestability status once it is registered.
The Supreme Court then examined whether an incontestable but merely
descriptive mark could be protected from infringement by injunction. Because
the incontestability provisions do not include a specific defense against merely
descriptive marks, 61 the Court inferred that Congress intended to exclude
such a defense.62 Congress apparently intended to protect merely descriptive
marks that attained presumptive distinctiveness through continuous use and
registration. This conclusion is supported by the legislative history of the
Lanham Act. When the Act was considered by Congress, the Justice De-
partment expressed concern that a merely descriptive mark that lacked a
53. 105 S. Ct. 658, 667 (1985).
54. Id. at 664.
55. Id. at 661. (citing S. REP. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1946)).
56. 105 S. Ct. at 661.
57. Id. (citing S. REP. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. at 6 (1946) (finding that Congress
favored maximum, nationwide protection for trademarks as a matter of public policy).
58. 105 S. Ct. at 664-65.
59. Id. at 661-62; see supra note 28 and accompanying text.
60. Id. at 662; see supra note 29 and accompanying text.
61. Id.; see supra note 3Q and accompanying text.
62. The Court stated that, because Congress provided for the defense of common descrip-
tiveness, Congress could also have included mere descriptiveness as a defense to incontestable
rights. Id. (citing H.R. CONF. REP. No. 2321, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1946))
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distinctive quality could attain incontestable status. 63 Congress responded to
these concerns by creating procedures for challenging registered marks for
five years before the marks can attain incontestable status.' These procedures
are the sole remedy under the Act for companies that want to challenge
marks as merely descriptive.
Finally, the Court criticized the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of the effect
of incontestability in infringement actions. The Court found no support
under the incontestability provisions for the offensive/defensive distinction
drawn by the Ninth Circuit. 65 The Court reasoned that the Ninth Circuit's
rule violated Congress's policy of granting trademark owners the exclusive
right to use their mark. 66 The Court also discredited the Ninth Circuit's case
law on incontestability. The Court observed that the Tillamook decision, 67
cited by the Ninth Circuit in support of the offensive/defensive distinction,
recognized that distinction only in dicta." The Tillamook court held, on the
facts, that a defendant owned a common law right to the "Tillamook" mark
before the plaintiff registered its mark; the common law right was decisive.
The distinction between offensive and defensive uses of incontestability were
not relevant to this decision. Furthermore, the Tillamook court relied on an
early Seventh Circuit case, John Morrell & Co. v. Reliable Packing Co.,69
as authority for its interpretation of section 33 of the Lanham Act. The
Supreme Court, however, found Morrell to be unpersuasive authority for
two reasons. First, the Morrell court relied on Rand McNally & Co. v.
Christmas Club,70 which itself discussed the distinction only briefly in dicta. 7
63. 105 S. Ct. at 664 (citing Hearings on H.R. 82 Before the Subcomm. of the Senate
Comm. on Patents, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. 59-60 (1944)) (stating that incontestable status for
descriptive marks would "create an exclusive right to use language that is descriptive of a
product").
64. 105 S. Ct. at 665.
65. The Court stated that the language in the three enumerated defenses in § 33(b) dem-
onstrated Congress's intent to allow plaintiffs to use incontestability in infringement actions.
105 S. Ct. at 662.
66. Id. at 663.
67. 345 F.2d 158 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 903 (1965).
68. 105 S. Ct. at 667.
69. 295 F.2d 314 (7th Cir. 1961) (overruled by Union Carbide v. Ever-Ready, Inc., 531
F.2d 366 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 830 (1976)).
70. 105 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 499 (1955), aff'd, 242 F.2d 776 (C.C.P.A. 1957).
71. 105 S. Ct. at 667. The registered term in Rand McNally was "Christmas Club" for the
title of a periodical. The plaintiff. brought a petition to cancel registralion of the defendant's
mark within five years of its registration. Therefore, the Rand McNally court was not faced
with an infringement action based on incontestable rigths. 242 F.2d 776, 777 (C.C.P.A. 1957).
In dicta, however, the Rand McNally court discussed the effect of incontestability in order
to address the plaintiff's concern that should the challenged mark become incontestable, it
could not be used to enjoin the use of the same mark by a different service. 105 S. Ct. at 667.
See Rand McNally & Co. v. Christmas Club, 105 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 499 (1955), aff'd, 242 F.2d
776 (C.C.P.A. 1957), where the court stated:
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Second, the Morrell decision was overruled by the Seventh Circuit in Union
Carbide v. Ever-Ready, Inc. 2 The Court concluded that the Ninth Circuit's
reliance on the case law supporting the offensive/defensive distinction was
misplaced."3
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens agreed with the Court's conclusion
that "the descriptive character of the mark does not provide an infringer
with a defense."1 4 Justice Stevens determined, however, that the majority
erred when it applied that conclusion to a merely descriptive mark that had
not been shown to be distinctive of the registrant's goods.7 According to
Justice Stevens, the real issue in the case was whether an "inherently unre-
gistrable" mark could provide the basis for an injunction.7 6 He argued that
the plaintiff had never shown any proof of distinctiveness in the "Park'N
Fly" mark.17 Therefore, the Court should have construed the Lanham Act
as a whole to determine whether a merely descriptive mark, without proof
of distinctiveness, could become incontestable."8
The effect of "incontestability" is a defensive and not an offensive effect. To put
it another way, when the right to use a given mark has become incontestable, the
owner's rights are in no wise broadened, but he is free from challenges of his right
to continue to use the mark to identify and distinguish the goods recited in the
registration, subject only to the defenses and defects enumerated in Section (I I15(b)]
of the Statute.
105 U.S.P.Q. at 501. The Supreme Court found that this dicta had been misinterpreted and
could no longer be used to support the offensive/defensive distinction. 105 S. Ct. at 667. The
Court interpreted the dicta to mean, "that a mark may not be expanded beyond the good or
service for which it was originally designated." Id.; see Ferber, Trade-marks-Incontestability-
Union Carbide Corp. v. Ever-Ready Inc., 18 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REv. 396, 410 (1976)
(supporting this interpretation of the dicta).
72. 531 F.2d 366 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 830 (1976). The court of appeals in
Union Carbide reviewed the language and legislative history of the Lanham Act and found no
support for the prior decision in Morrell. The court then determined that the dicta in Rand
McNally also failed to support the reasoning in Morrell. Accordingly, Morrell was overruled.
73. 105 S. Ct. at 667.
74. Id. at 669 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
75. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
76. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens limited his agreement with the court to only
those cases in which the merely descriptive mark has an "obvious and well-established secondary
meaning."
77. Id. at 668 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
78. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). According to Justice Stevens, the plaintiff's "Park'N Fly"
mark was "inherently unregistrable" because it was merely descriptive, and there had been no
proof of its distinctiveness. But see Fletcher, Incontestability and Constructive Notice: A Quarter
Century of Adjudication, 63 TRADE-MARK REP. 71, 97 (1973), where the author states:
In principle, there is no distinction between the defense of functionality and several
others ...which also go to inherent registrability and are generally recognized as
being cut off by incontestability. The theory seems to be that once a potential
infringer or cancellation petitioner has been put on notice of the claim to rights in
an allegedly unregistrable mark for a certain period, he must either take action or
live with the consequences of his failure to do so. It is no more than an arbitrary,
statutory application of the principles of laches, acquiescence and estoppel, justified
by the difficulties in establishing actual reliance.
Id. at 97.
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Justice Stevens relied on the Lanham Act and its legislative history to
support his conclusion that the incontestable status of the plaintiff's mark
should not preclude the Court from reviewing its registrability. He found
that Congress provided broad authority for courts to review the validity of
trademarks in any trademark action.79 Justice Stevens also reasoned that
Congress did not provide for a merely descriptive defense to incontestable
marks because procedures were established to prevent merely descriptive
marks which lacked distinctiveness from reaching the incontestable status."0
He concluded that the legislative policy of providing strong protection for
trademarks did not include protection for indistinctive marks . 8
Finally, Justice Stevens criticized Justice O'Connor's main arguments in
support of the Court's holding. First, in construing the Lanham Act, Justice
Stevens argued that the incontestability provisions should be read together
with the registration provisions. Under this analysis, Justice Stevens con-
cluded that a mark must be registrable before it can become incontestable,82
and that the plaintiff's mark was not necessarily registrable because it could
have been merely descriptive. Second, Justice Stevens argued that the legis-
lative history of the Act did not support the conclusion that incontestability
can protect merely descriptive marks that lack distinctiveness.83 He concluded
that the defense was not listed in the Act because merely descriptive marks
were not supposed to be registered, absent a showing of distinctiveness, and
that Congress may have assumed that merely descriptive marks would never
be registered. 84 Finally, Justice Stevens argued that it is not too burdensome
for registrants to prove the distinctiveness of an incontestable mark in an
infringement suit.85 In Justice Steven's view, instead of granting the plaintiff
an injunction based solely on the mark's incontestable status, the Court
should have required proof from the plaintiff that the "Park'N Fly" mark
was distinctive of the plaintiff's services.1
6
79. 105 S. Ct. at 668 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
80. Id. at 670 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens cited testimony before a House
subcommittee hearing by Dr. Karl Pohl, who suggested that the procedure for registration
would make it difficult for merely descriptive marks to become registered, absent a showing of
distinctiveness. See Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Trade-Marks of the House Comm. on
Patents on H.R. 102, H.R. 5461, and S. 895, 77th Cong., Ist Sess. 136 (1941).
81. 105 S. Ct. at 671 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens interpreted § 33(b) in
conjunction with § 2(e)-(f), which prohibit the registration of a merely descriptive mark absent
proof of distinctiveness. See 15 U.S.C. §§ I I15(b), 1053(e)-(f) (1982).
82. 105 S. Ct. at 673-674 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
83. Id. at 674 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
84. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens stated that the Court's interpretation of
Congress's "failure to include mere descriptiveness" as a defense in the statute endorses
incontestable status for merely descriptive marks.
85. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
86. Justice Stevens stated that this approach to the case would promote the purposes of the
Lanham Act by requiring that the statutory procedures to be followed. Id. at 674-75 (Stevens,
J., dissenting).
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ANALYSIS
By abolishing the offensive/defensive distinction in the common law of
trademark incontestability, the Park'N Fly decision strengthened federal
trademark protection.17 The majority opinion set forth a strict statutory
approach to trademark infringement actions that reenforces the legislative
policy behind the Lanham Act.8 Because the majority construed the incon-
testability provisions strictly, and refused to weigh the "strength" of the
plaintiff's mark against the defendant's infringement, the Court revitalized
the status of incontestability under the Act.8 9 A more detailed analysis of
Congress's intent to establish incontestable rights for trademark owners,
however, is needed to cement the Court's interpretation of trademark pro-
tection. 90
The Park'N Fly Court strictly construed the Lanham Act to determine
that the plaintiff could rely on the incontestable status of its mark to enjoin
the mark's infringement. In its examination of the incontestability provisions,
the Court fou'nd that Congress intended to provide the registrant with the
"exclusive right to use" incontestable trademarks. 9' The Court correctly
interpreted this language to preclude the Ninth Circuit's offensive/defensive
distinction in incontestable rights2 Moreover, the Court found that the Act's
guarantee to registrants of an "exclusive right to use," and the limited list
of defenses against incontestable marks, proved that Congress intended to
87. The offensive/defensive distinction neutralized the value of § 33(b). Section 33(b) cannot
be effective in an infringement action unless the validity of the incontestable mark was
challenged. Therefore, § 33(b) would provide defensive protection for the incontestable mark.
Yet, when there was no challenge to the incontestable mark's validity, § 33(b) was not argued
since the distinction only prohibited the offensive assertion of incontestable rights. Therefore,
§ 33(b) was neutralized by the offensive/defensive distinction and only provided a defense
against cancellation. For a more extensive analysis of the effect of the offensive/defensive
distinction, see McKnight, Section 33(b) of the Lanham Act: What Effect in Trademark
Infringement Ligitation? 72 TRADE-MARK REP. 329 (1982) (inconsistent judicial interpretations
of incontestability affected rights of trademark owners in infringement litigation).
88. See infra notes 91-96 and accompanying text.
89. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. See, e.g., Volkswagenwerk A.G. v. Church,
256 F. Supp. 626 (S.D. Cal. 1966) (court permitted defense of mere descriptiveness to be raised).
90. See infra notes 99-105 and accompanying text.
91. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
92. 105 S. Ct. at 663. See also Hearings on H.R. 4744 Before the Subcomm. on Trade-
Marks of the House Comm. on Patents, 76th Cong., Ist Sess. 105 (1939) (statement of Robert
W. Byerly). Mr. Byerly noted that courts could misinterpret the effect of incontestability:
"[Nlow if that same doctrine of construction should be applied here . . . the court might hold
that we had a right to sue others, but have not been given the right to use it ourselves." The
authors of the Lanham Act feared that judicial misconstruction would interfere with the
incontestable trademark owner's right to protect the mark. To the contrary, the courts misin-
terpreted incontestability to preclude the right to sue others, until the Park'N Fly Court
eliminated the offensive/defensive distinction.
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limit challenges to incontestable trademark rights.93 The Court's rejection of
the offensive/defensive distinction promotes uniform application of federal
trademark rights, 94 which dovetails the policy of the Lanham Act.95
The Court also applied a strict statutory approach to the question of
whether an infringing party can defend itself by arguing that an incontestable
mark was merely descriptive and therefore improperly registered. The Court
determined that because Congress did not list descriptiveness among the
enumerated defenses, it could not be raised by defendants.9 6 The dissent did
not agree with this statutory construction. 97 Justice Stevens argued that
although mere descriptiveness was not an enumerated defense, the Lanham
Act construed as a whole did not preclude the review of the distinctiveness
of a merely descriptive mark that had attained incontestable status.98 Al-
though the majority reached the proper decision on this issue, Justice O'Con-
nor's opinion for the Court did not respond to Justice Steven's conclusion
that the scheme of the Lanham Act supported the defense.
A more thorough analysis of the history of the Act reinforces the Court's
conclusion that Congress intended to protect merely descriptive, incontestable
trademarks from review. The testimony of Edward S. Rogers in the House
subcommittee hearings on the Lanham Act indicates that the purpose of the
incontestability provisions is to offer more protection for trademarks than
pre-Lanham Act trademark law.9 9 Mr. Rogers commented that the existing
trademark law allowed for the cancellation of a trademark registration at
93. 105 S. Ct. at 663. The Supreme Court indicated that the defenses enumerated in
§ 33(b)(4), (5), & (6), because they were crafted for use in infringement actions, anticipated
the offensive use of incontestability to enforce a registrant's trademark rights. 15 U.S.C. §
i15(b)(4), (5), & (6) (1982).
94. This particular decision by the Court resolves a conflict between the circuits on the
exclusive use of the "Park'N Fly" mark. Compare Park'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly,
718 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1983) (enforcement of exclusive use refused), with Park'N Fly, Inc. v.
Park & Fly, Inc., 489 F. Supp. 422 (D. Mass. 1979) (enforcement granted).
95. See Hearings on H.R. 82 Before Subcomm. of the Sen. Comm. on Patents, 78th Cong.,
2d Sess. 19-20 (1944) (statements of Daphne Robert). One of the five main purposes behind
the Lanham Act was "to put all existing trade-mark statutes in a simple piece of legislation."
This statute highlights the legislative policy to provide uniform federal protection for trademarks.
96. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
97. See supra notes 75-78 and accompanying text.
98. See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
99. Hearings on H.R. 4744 Before the Subcomm. on Trade-Marks of the House Comm.
on Patents, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 106-07 (1939) (statement of Edward S. Rogers). Mr. Rogers
stated:
Of course the purpose of this incontestable business is to clean house. The existing
law is that a trade-mark of the registrant may be cancelled at any time, and the
courts interpret at any time to mean just that. The result is that old marks that
have been registered under the act of 1881 and that have been renewed from time
to time are always subject to cancellation, which tends to a feeling of insecurity in
trade-mark property.
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any time."' He also stated that the trademark provisions for incontestability
foreclosed attack upon a registrant's trademark right."' Representative Lan-
ham, sponsor of the trademark law, stated that a trademark holder should
be able to rely on its right and be secure from challenge after five years of
continuous use, or "otherise he is simply likely to the formenting litiga-
t io n . " l1 2
Moreover, the legislative record reveals Congress's intent to bar challenges
against merely descriptive marks, once such marks are registered. RobertW.
Byerly testified before the Senate Subcommittee that once a mark is regis-
tered, the issue of whether the mark was merely descriptive should not be
raised in court."") Mr. Byerly also stated that if Congress intended to allow
the defense of mere descriptiveness, then Congress should have denied
incontestable protection for merely descriptive marks."4 Byerly reasoned that
it would be less confusing to leave merely descriptive marks unprotected
than to give mark owners illusory protection and then allow defendants to
challenge the registrability of the disputed mark.''5 Congress apparently
accepted Byerly's reasoning because the Lanham Act provides for the pro-
tection of merely descriptive marks under the incontestability provisions and
excludes the defense of mere descriptiveness. In sum, the legislative history
of the Lanham Act supports the Supreme Court's holding that an incon-
testable mark cannot be challenged as merely descriptive.
The Court's interpretation of the Lanham Act was also correct as a matter
of trademark policy. Had the Court adopted the dissent's approach and
required the.plaintiff to prove the distinctiveness of its mark,"'6 the policy
behind the incontestability provisions would have been emasculated. Trade-
100. Id.
101. Id. at 107. "That is, the registrant who has been on the register 5 years, and no one
has interfered with him, no one has a prior claim has asserted it, ought to be foreclosed. That
is, the right to use the mark should be incontestable, in commerce."
102. Hearings on H.R. 101, H.R. 5461 and S. 895 Before the Subcomm. on Trade-marks
of the House Comm. on Patents, 77th Cong., Ist Sess. 72 (1942) (statement of Rep. Lanham).
103. Id. at 65 (statement of Robert W. Byerly). Mr. Byerly stated:
[Blut it would seem to indicate that the issue would be whether the word "Shaker"
was merely descriptive of salt, which is a question which ought to be abolished by
the registration after we have permitted such registration ....
104. Id. at 64-65 (Statement of Robert W. Byerly). Mr. Byerly stated:
Now if the American Bar Association is convinced that it is wrong to have
incontestability on marks which are registered under Section (f) paragraph (f),
Section 2, that could very readily be taken care of by simply saying in the section
which provides for incontestability that it shall not apply to marks registered under
paragraph (f. That, I think, woud be a mistake, but it seems to me the frank way
to deal with it. But when you come to introduce a defense against incontestable
mark the descriptive . . . you create confusion, because you practically say that
the defendant can attack the incontestability on a ground which really has nothing
to do with the registrability of the mark . ..
105. Id.
106. See supra notes 76-86 and accompanying text.
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marks would have virtually no protection at all. The Court observed that
section 14(a) of the Lanham Act permits a cancellation petition to be filed
against a registered mark that is merely descriptive within the first five years
of registration." 7 Congress therefore intended to protect merely descriptive
registrations from review after five years."' 8 The Court reasoned that incon-
testability must provide at least as much protection as registration."'9 The
Court properly concluded that a review of the distinctiveness of the plaintiff's
incontestable mark would abolish any protection that incontestability is
designed to provide.'"'
IMPACT
The Park'N Fly Court's reinstatement of uniformity in federal trademark
protection extends strong federal rights to owners of incontestable trade-
marks."' The decision implements the legislative policy expressed in the
history of the Lanham Act to foreclose certain attacks on the validity of a
trademark's registration. "2 When an owner's trademark attains incontestable
status, the owner may enforce the right to use the mark without having to
prove the mark's validity. Thus, the Park'N Fly decision enhances the ability
of an incontestable trademark owner to enforce its right to use the mark.
The sponsors of the Lanham Act intended to make federal registration of
trademarks more desirable so that more trademark owners would register
their marks with the federal government." 3 Increased use of the federal
trademark system will enhance trademark identification" 4 and thereby stim-
ulate competition in the marketplace.' The Court's affirmative endorsement
107. Section 14(a) provides in part:
A verified petition to cancel a registration of a mark, stating the grounds relied
upon, may . . . be filed by any person who believes that he is or will be damaged
by the registration of a mark on the principal register . . .
(a) within five years from the date of the registration of the mark under this chapter ....
15 U.S.C. § 1064(a) (1982).
108. Id.
109. 105 S. Ct. at 663-65.
110. Id.
111. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
112. See supra notes 99-105 and accompanying text.
113. See Hearing on H.R. 82 Before Subcomm. of the Sen. Comm. on Patents, 78th Cong.,
2d Sess. 19-21 (1944) (statements of Daphne Roberts). Ms. Roberts stated "[tlhis bill will bring
about, as I think I have stated heretofore, an incentive to register because it provides in Section
15, for example, an incontestable right."
114. See Callmann, The New Trade-mark Act of July 5, 1946, 46 COLUM. L. REV. 929 (1946)
(analysis of purpose behind the passage of Lanham Act).
115. See S. REP. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. I (1946), reprinted in 1946 U.S. Code
Cong. & Ad. News 1274. The Senate Committee Report shows that the Lanham bill was
designed to stimulate competition in the marketplace. Id. The Committee explained:
Trade-marks, indeed, are the essence of competition, because they make possible a
choice between competing articles by enabling the buyer to distinguish one from
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of the plaintiff's incontestable right to use the "Park'N Fly" mark should
make federal registration of trademarks more desirable and, therefore, more
likely to fulfill the goals that support the Lanham Act."
6
Finally, the Park'N Fly decision is one of the few Supreme Court cases
to discuss the Lanham Act." 7 The Court's strict statutory approach will
provide guidance to the lower courts on how to interpret the incontestability
provisions. The lower courts may search the legislative history of the Act to
find legislative intent contrary to the Court's interpretation of incontesta-
bility. Nevertheless, an analysis of the legislative history demonstrates that
the Court interpreted the incontestability provisions correctly.," The Park'N
Fly case signals that the Lanham Act strongly favors incontestable rights.
CONCLUSION
In Park'N Fly, the Supreme Court conclusively established that a trade-
mark owner can rely on the incontestable status of a mark to enjoin an
the other . . . To protect trade-marks, therefore, is to protect the public from
deceit, to foster fair competition, and to secure to the business community the
advantages of reputation and good will by preventing their diversion from those
who have created them to those who have not.
Id. at 1275.
Since the Park 'N Fly decision eliminates the defense of mere descriptiveness from the
challenges to incontestable trademarks, the decision returns the strong rights to trademark
owners that the legislature intended with the passage of the Lanham Act. The Court's
enforcement of strong trademark rights will allow trademark owners to exercise their incon-
testable rights with more confidence. As trademark rights are exercised more frequently,
marketplace competition becomes stronger.
116. Federal registration of trademarks is made more desirable by the Park'N Fly decision.
By passing the Lanham Act, Congress sought to encourage extensive use of the trademark
system to promote competition among producers. With greater use of the trademark system,
however, the United States Patent and Trademark Office is more likely to mistakenly register
a merely descriptive mark. To remedy this problem, the Patent Office can examine applications
more closely in order to prevent the possibility that a merely descriptive mark becomes
incontestable and non-reviewable. More likely, competitors will protect their rights more ag-
gressively against registrants of merely descriptive marks to prevent such marks from becoming
incontestable. One commentator observed:
However, with the rapid proliferation of new product and marketing ideas, many
trademark claimants are forced to commence a lawsuit to protect their rights before
their trademark registrations have acquired the status of incontestability, and some-
times before any registration has issued. Thus, the issue of secondary meaning
frequently finds its way into a trademark case.
Ropski and Johnson, A "Nonobvious" Frainework for Analyzing Proof of Secondary Meaning,
10-11 AM. PAT. L.A.Q.J. 211, 222-23 (1983).
117. See Inwood Labs, Inc. v. Ives Labs, Inc., 456 U.S. 844 (1982) (generic drug manufacturer
vicariously liable for infringement of trademark); Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing
Co., 386 U.S. 714 (1967) (federal courts have no jurisdiction to award attorney's fees as separate
element Of recovery in light of § 35 of the Act). See also I J. GILSON, TRADEMARK PROTECTION
AND PRACTICE 5 (Cum. Supp. 1984) (Court has not decided trademark case on the merits, or
interpreted a section of the Act dealing with the scope of enforceable rights, in several decades).
118. See supra notes 99-105 and accompanying text.
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infringement. The Park'N Fly Court also established that a defendant in an
infringement action cannot defeat a claim by proving that an incontestable
mark is invalid because it is merely descriptive. The Court's decision is based
on a strict construction of the Lanham Act's incontestability provisions.
Trademark owners will welcome the Park'N Fly decision because it provides
legal security against infringement. Businesses will increasingly use federal
registration to protect their marks. Moreover, trademark owners will be more
diligent in seeking cancellation of merely descriptive marks that they believe
are not distinctive of the source for which they were registered. On the
whole, registrants will more fully appreciate and exercise their trademark
rights after the Park'N Fly decision.
Paula Shopiro

